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ANIMAL LAW-WHEN DOGS BITE: A FAIR, EFFECTIVE, AND
COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEM OF DOG ATTACKS
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose two families-the Smiths and the Joneses-relocate to the
city of Maumelle, Arkansas.' Also suppose that each family brings along its
beloved dog: Sparky Smith, a Labrador Retriever, and Johnny Jones, an
American Bulldog.2 For the sake of illustration, assume the following set of
facts about these two dogs: Sparky, an unaltered male, is an "outside dog"
and is wary of strangers (especially children) who approach his territory. In
the past, Sparky has growled at and nipped young children who reached
through a chain link fence that surrounds the Smiths' back yard, attacked
several postal employees, and harassed and intimidated utility workers.
Sparky is also an escape artist and regularly manages to jump over or dig
under the fences that surround his yard. Previously, Sparky bit and severely
injured a small boy's hand. The Smiths paid for the boy's medical care, and
his parents agreed not to pursue the matter further.
Johnny, on the other hand, is a "gentle giant" who spends most of his
time asleep on the family couch. Johnny has never displayed any aggression
and is particularly calm around small children. He was neutered while a
puppy and is never allowed to roam at large; Mr. or Mrs. Jones always su-
pervises Johnny when he is unleashed outside in his yard.
Which dog would you suppose the city of Maumelle will legislate most
harshly against? If you answered "Sparky," you are incorrect! Pursuant to
section 10-134(f) of the Maumelle City Code, it will be illegal for the Jo-
neses to even bring Johnny with them to Maumelle.3 He will be banned
1. The beautiful city of Maumelle is located in north-central Pulaski County, Arkansas,
and has an estimated population of 15,867. United States Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov (follow "American FactFinder" hyperlink; then follow "Population
Finder" hyperlink; then enter "Maumelle" and select "Arkansas" (last visited Oct. 12, 2009)).
As of the 2000 Census, Maumelle had the highest median household income and the lowest
portion of its population living below the poverty line among all cities in the state with a
population above one hundred people. United States Census Bureau,
http://factfmder.census.gov (follow "people" hyperlink, then follow "income" hyperlink,
then enter "Maumelle" and select "Arkansas", then follow "Income and Poverty: for all
city/town in state" hyperlink (last visited Oct. 12, 2009)). Maumelle is also the home of the
author, his wife, and their three fabulous pugs.
2. These breeds were chosen to demonstrate the operation of a local ordinance. The
author intends no comment on either breed's suitability as a pet or any offense toward their
respective devotees.
3. MAUMELLE, ARK., CODE § 10-134(f) (2002). The ordinance provides the following:
Banning of specific breeds. Banned breeds of dogs are banned entirely and may not be
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from the city-not because of any particular threat he poses to the commu-
nity-but because he is a member of a breed singled out as inherently dan-
gerous. Sparky, conversely, will be allowed to come with his family, and
unless he is found to be vicious or dangerous by the office of animal servic-
es, 4 will be free to roam the fences of his yard and prey upon anyone who
dares to approach the Smiths' home.
This hypothetical demonstrates the problem with so-called breed-
specific legislation and dangerous-dog laws.5 Under the former, a dog is not
judged on his behavior and disposition but rather upon his identity as a
member of a particular breed that has been deemed--on the whole-to be
unusually prone to violent attacks. 6 Under the latter, a dog is deemed dan-
gerous or vicious vis-A-vis documented complaints in a particular jurisdic-
tion.7 Maumelle is just one of many cities throughout Arkansas and the
country that has adopted such an approach to further the public policy of
preventing vicious dog attacks.8 As the hypothetical demonstrates, however,
these laws do not address the root of the problem and have unfortunate,
inefficient, and unintended consequences.
This note proposes a comprehensive solution to the problem of dog bi-
tes and maulings. It begins by exploring the various means adopted by state
and local governments in recent years to reduce the number of vicious dog
attacks, specifically focusing on breed-specific and dangerous-dog laws and
owned or kept within the city. Banned breeds of dogs are any of the following:
(1) American Pit Bull Terrier.
(2) Staffordshire Bull Terrier.
(3) American Staffordshire Terrier.
(4) American Bulldog.
(5) Any dog whose sire or dam is a dog of a breed which is defined as a
banned breed of dog under this section.
(6) Any dog whose owner registers, defines, admits or otherwise identifies
the dog as being of a banned breed.
(7) Any dog conforming or substantially conforming to the breed of
American Pit Bull Terrier, American Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire
Bull Terrier, or American Bulldog as defined by the United Kennel Club or
American Kennel Club.
(8) Any dog which is of the breed commonly referred to as "pit bull" and
commonly recognizable and identifiable as such.
(9)Any vicious dog which is found at large in violation of section 10-90.
4. See MAUMELLE, ARK., CODE § 10-133(b) (2002).
5. See discussion infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part II.A.2.
7. See infra Part II.A. 1.
8. See, e.g., LITTLE ROCK, ARK., CODE § 6-20 (1988); NORTH LITTLE ROCK, ARK.,
CODE § 10-46 (1996); PINE BLUFF, ARK., CODE § 5-27 (1990); CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE §
701-6 (2003); DENVER, COLO., CODE § 8-55 (1982). These ordinances (and many others) may




the legal effects of each approach.9 Next, the note will survey the civil re-
medies a victim of a dog attack might have against the dog's owner and the
efficacy of each.'0 The note will then explore the limited, though recently
expanded, circumstances under which a dog owner can be held criminally
liable for the actions of his dog." With this frame of reference, the note will
propose the following three-point plan to remedy the problem of vicious
dog attacks: (1) the scope of criminal liability should continue to expand in
the case of preventable and especially violent attacks; (2) a dog owner's
civil liability should be based on a simple negligence standard under which
neither the animal's breed nor its prior behavioral history are entirely dispo-
sitive, but rather factors to be considered in determining the scope of the
owner's duty; and (3) state and local dog registration laws should be prac-
tical, easily enforceable, and aimed solely at promoting responsible dog
ownership, whatever the breed.
II. BACKGROUND
In recent years, the dog-bite problem has become an epidemic.' 2 Re-
cent estimates show that four to five million Americans, or approximately
two percent of the population, experience a dog attack each year.' 3 Of this
group, more than fifty percent are young children; 14 in fact, more than half
of American children have been bitten at least once before the age of
twelve.15 Furthermore, the severity of dog attacks is increasing.' 6 Each year,
more than 350,000 emergency room visits involve a serious dog bite; this
averages out to be about 960 dog attacks per day.
17
Fortunately, however, even the most violent attacks do not usually re-
sult in the victim's death.' 8 Nevertheless, the overall cost to society is stag-
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See Safia Gray Hussain, Attacking the Dog-Bite Epidemic: Why Breed-Specific
Legislation Won't Solve the Dangerous-Dog Dilemma, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2847, 2849
(2006).
13. Id. at 2849 (citing Kenneth Morgan Phillips, Dog Bite Statistics,
http://www.dogbitelaw.com/PAGES/statistics.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009)).
14. Id. (citing Phillips, supra note 13).
15. Id. (citing Phillips, supra note 13).
16. For example, "while the dog population increased only two percent between 1986
and 1996, the number of dog bites requiring medical attention rose thirty-seven percent." Id.
(citing Matt Wapner & James F. Wilson, Are Laws Prohibiting Ownership of Pit Bull-Type
Dogs Legally Enforceable?, J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N, May 15, 2000, at 1552).
17. Id. at 2850 (citing the ubiquity of dog bites as discussed in Wapner & Wilson, supra
note 16, at 1552) ("dog bites now rank among the top causes of nonfatal injuries, and are
responsible second only to baseball and softball injuries for emergency room visits.")).
18. Hussain, supra note 12, at 2850 (citing Phillips, supra note 13).
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gering. Not only do the most severe nonfatal attacks require extensive med-
ical care, but they also wreak havoc on the insurance industry. 9 In response,
many insurers specifically exclude losses stemming from dog bites in their
homeowners' policies while others refuse altogether to write policies for
homeowners who keep particularly dangerous breeds in their homes.2 °
A. Municipal Regulation of Dog Ownership
Given the problem's local nature, it is not surprising that the principal
laws governing the keeping of dogs as pets are state, local, and municipal
ordinances. 21 Generally, these ordinances are aimed at regulating the owner-
ship of potentially vicious dogs within a given jurisdiction.22 There are es-
sentially two types of these laws: dangerous-dog laws and breed-specific
legislation.23 Dangerous-dog laws impose ownership regulations on particu-
larly vicious or dangerous dogs; the determination that a dog is vicious or
dangerous is usually based on the dog's prior conduct.24 Breed-specific leg-
islation, on the other hand, "regulates or bans ownership of particular breeds
based on a belief that the breed is inherently vicious or dangerous. 25
1. Dangerous-Dog Laws
The goal of dangerous-dog laws is "to reduce the threat dangerous
dogs pose to the public by requiring owners of dogs so labeled to abide by
statutorily defined precautionary measures. 26 Generally, in order to be clas-
sified as dangerous or vicious, the dog must have threatened or injured a
person who was lawfully on the owner's premises and who did not provoke
the attack.27 These laws impose regulations on owners based on an examina-
19. Id. (citing the effects of dog bites on the insurance industry as discussed in Phillips,
supra note 13 and Charles Toutant, Putting a Leash on Dog-Bite Claims: Carriers Seek to
Limit Homeowner Coverage for Fierce Canine Breeds, 173 N.J. L.J. 277, 277 (2003) (stating
that dog bites "account for one-third of homeowner insurance claims nationally, and insur-
ance companies pay out approximately $345 million of the more than $1 billion loss asso-
ciated with dog bites annually")).
20. Id. (citing Toutant, supra note 19, at 277).
21. See id. at 2854. See also MARY RANDOLPH, EVERY DOG's LEGAL GUIDE: A
MUST-HAVE BOOK FOR YOUR OWNER 286 (6th ed. 2007).
22. Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia regulate the ownership of dangerous
dogs on a statewide level. RANDOLPH, supra note 21, at 279.
23. See Hussain, supra note 12, at 2854.
24. Id. at 2854-55.
25. Id. at 2854.
26. Id. at 2855.
27. See id. See also RANDOLPH, supra note 21, at 280.
[Vol. 32
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tion of the "behavioral history of a particular dog and owner" and not on the
perceived dangerousness of its breed in general.28
One of the obvious challenges inherent to dangerous-dog laws is en-
forcement. Any investigation into a potentially dangerous dog must logical-
ly begin with a formal complaint from a member of the public, animal con-
trol officer, or bite victim. 29 In the next step of the process, the appropriate
animal control agency notifies the owner that complaints have been filed
against the dog or that the agency has found the dog to be vicious or dan-
gerous by an independent investigation.30 The agency then schedules a hear-
ing in which the owner may "contest the determination before a judge or
public health official.",3 1 If the owner is unsuccessful and the judge or offi-
cial confirms the agency's determination, he must undertake "statutorily
provided safety precautions or risk fines or forfeiture and possible destruc-
tion of the dog.",32 It is usually within the judge's discretion to "order imme-




Rather than determining whether a dog is dangerous based on prior
conduct, breed-specific legislation targets all dogs of a certain breed "based
solely on membership in that breed., 34 The enactment of these laws is often
preceded by a particularly vicious and often fatal attack by a dog of a par-
ticularly dangerous breed.35 The spectrum of breed-specific legislation is
quite wide, with some jurisdictions imposing a total breed ban 36 and others
only requiring additional licensing requirements.37 Despite this variety, the
procedural operation of most breed-specific ordinances is similar. 38 After
receiving notice of an allegedly "illegal" dog, the appropriate agency will
investigate to determine whether the dog is affected by the ordinance. If the
28. See Hussain, supra note 12, at 2855.
29. See id. See also RANDOLPH, supra note 21, at 279.
30. Hussain, supra note 12, at 2855.
31. Id. at 2856.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2859 ("Breed-specific legislation regulates or bans ownership of particular
breeds, typically providing that ownership of a target breed is prima facie evidence of owner-
ship of a vicious or dangerous dog.")
35. Id.
36. For example, the City of Maumelle, Arkansas, bans all pit bulls (specifically the
American Pit Bull Terrier, Staffordshire Bull Terrier, and the American Staffordshire Ter-
rier) as well as American Bulldogs. MAUMELLE, ARK., CODE § 10-134(f) (2002).
37. See, e.g., PINE BLUFF, ARK., CODE § 5-43 (1990).
38. See Hussain, supra note 12, at 2861.
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agency classifies the dog as a member of the prohibited breed, the burden
shifts to the owner to present evidence that the dog is not a member of the
target breed, thereby defeating the applicability of such an ordinance.39 Ul-
timately, if the owner cannot overcome the presumption that the dog is a
member of the prohibited breed, he "must abide by statutorily imposed safe-
ty precautions or risk fines or forfeiture and possible destruction of the
dog.""0
3. Constitutionality of Dog Registration Laws
Two United States Supreme Court rulings have established that "legis-
lation regulating dogs is a valid exercise of the states' police power"'41 and
"that such regulations do not amount to a violation of a dog owner's subs-
tantive due process. 4 2 Dangerous-dog laws also generally survive Equal
Protection 43 challenges "[b]ecause they serve a legitimate governmental
interest in protecting the public health and welfare." 44 Nevertheless, proce-
dural due process issues often arise because particular owners might not
have the opportunity to contest a determination that their dog is vicious or
dangerous under the relevant law.45 Generally, however, it is relatively easy
for a municipality to draft and enforce a dangerous-dog law that does not
offend the Constitution.
Because most breed-specific laws target only one or a few breeds,
scholars have argued that such laws violate the owners' constitutional right
to equal protection of the laws.46 The Equal Protection Clause says that
"[n]o State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.",47 The United States Supreme Court has stated that this
clause is "essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike." 48 Although countless laws operate by classifying people into
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2858 (noting the ruling of Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton Railroad Co.,
166 U.S. 698 (1897)).
42. Id. (noting the ruling ofNicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228 (1920)).
43. See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
44. See Hussain, supra note 12, at 2858.
45. See, e.g., Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Dep't of Animal Regulation, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
46. See Hussain, supra note 12, at 2862 n. 127 (citing Colo. Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. City
of Denver, 820 P.2d 644, 652 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Vanater v. Vill. of S. Point, 717 F.
Supp. 1236, 1245 (S.D. Ohio 1989); State v. Peters, 534 So. 2d 760, 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988)).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
[Vol. 32
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different groups,49 only those that classify people into suspect categories
(such as race, alienage, or national origin)50 or implicate fundamental rights
or interests (such as the freedom of association) 5I are subject to the highest
level of judicial review: strict scrutiny. 52 A middle level of review, interme-
diate scrutiny, is used where a law discriminates on the basis of gender.
53
Breed-specific legislation-like all laws not subjected to strict or interme-
diate scrutiny54 -faces the most deferential standard of judicial review, the
so-called "rational basis" test.
55
Most of the Equal Protection challenges against breed-specific ordin-
ances have been brought by owners of pit bulls who assert that they are be-
ing singled out and not receiving the same treatment under the law as other
dog owners. 6 Finding a rational relationship between concern for public
health and welfare and the classification and regulation of particularly dan-
gerous breeds, courts almost always hold that such ordinances are constitu-
tional.57
Other pit bull owners have challenged the constitutionality of the bans
on the bases of overbreadth, 58 under-inclusiveness, 59 and substantive due
49. For example, most states restrict people younger than sixteen from obtaining a driv-
er's license. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-604 (LEXIS Repl. 2008).
50. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
51. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958).
52. Professor Chemerinsky has summarized strict scrutiny thusly: "the government must
have a truly significant reason for discriminating, and it must show that it cannot achieve its
objective through any less discriminatory alternative." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 671 (3d ed. 2006).
53. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Under this standard of review, the government's
objective must be characterized as "important" (though not a "compelling" interest, as under
strict scrutiny) and the law must bear a "substantial relationship" to that objective.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 52, at 671.
54. The relative mutability of a given characteristic seems to be the key factor in receiv-
ing heightened scrutiny in an Equal Protection challenge. Race, national origin, and gender
are all immutable characteristics and receive heightened scrutiny. Professor Chemerinsky
posits that "it is unfair to penalize a person for characteristics that the person did not choose
and that the individual cannot change." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 52, at 672.
55. Rational basis review is by far the most deferential standard of review under Equal
Protection. First, unlike strict and intermediate scrutiny, the challenger bears the burden of
proof. Id. Second, all that is required is a rational relationship between the classification and
a legitimate (not even "important") governmental purpose. Id.
56. Because dog owners in general and pit bull owners specifically do not comprise a
suspect class or implicate a fundamental right, courts have almost uniformly applied minimal
scrutiny to breed-specific ordinances. See Hussain, supra note 12, at 2862 (citations omitted).
57. See Hussain, supra note 12, at 2862.
58. See Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991).
59. See Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute, Ordin-
ance, or Regulation Applying to Specific Dog Breeds, Such as "Pit Bulls'" or "Bull Ter-
riers," 80 A.L.R. 4th 70, 94 (1990).
2010]
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process.6' These challenges are almost always unsuccessful. Breed-specific
ordinances, however, have been successfully challenged under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine under procedural due process.6 6
Procedural due process generally requires that laws provide notice62
and the opportunity to be heard.63 Local ordinances must be sufficiently
definite so that ordinary persons can understand what conduct is prohi-
bited.64 Furthermore, when a law does not provide adequate notice or is
susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, it can constitute a violation of due
process via the void-for-vagueness doctrine.6 5 Owners of banned breeds
have successfully argued that the ordinances, particularly with regard to the
statutory definition of a pit bull, are unconstitutionally vague because there
is no such breed as a "pit bull" and that "the statute[s] [fail] to adequately
define the breeds included within the classification and thus subject to the
regulation., 66 Although the void-for-vagueness doctrine has not significant-
ly ameliorated pit bull bans, it has likely forced municipalities to sharpen
the language of their ordinances to give fair warning to dog owners of ex-
actly what breeds are banned.
B. Civil Suits for Harm Caused by Dog Bites
Tort law provides a system of redress for victims injured by dog bi-
tes.67 The owner of the attacking dog may be held liable through the com-
mon law one-bite rule,68 negligence, 69 or strict liability.7° Although these
60. See Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 772 P.2d 758 (Kan. 1989).
61. See Am. Dog Owners Ass'n. v. City of Des Moines, 469 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1991);
Am. Dog Owners Ass'n. v. City of Lynn, 533 N.E.2d 642 (Mass. 1989).
62. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
63. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
64. Reinert v. State, 348 Ark. 1, 4, 71 S.W.3d 52, 54 (2002).
65. See Township of Plymouth v. Hancock, 600 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Mich. Ct. App.
1999).
66. See Hussain, supra note 12, at 2866.
67. See, e.g., Hamby v. Haskins, 275 Ark. 385, 630 S.W.2d 37 (1982); Strange v. Sto-
vall, 261 Ark. 53, 546 S.W.2d 421 (1977); Finley v. Smith, 240 Ark. 323, 399 S.W.2d 271
(1966).
68. The rule is based on the notion that every dog should be allowed "one bite" before
the owner has actual or constructive knowledge of its propensity for viciousness. See, e.g.,
Cindy Andrist, Is There (and Should There Be) Any "Bite" Left in Georgia's "First Bite"
Rule?, 34 GA. L. REv. 1343, 1344 (2000) (quoting Torrance v. Brennan, 432 S.E.2d 658, 660
(Ga. Ct. App. 1993)).
69. See Rebecca F. Wisch, Quick Overview of Dog Bite Laws, Animal Legal & Histor-
ical Center, 2004, http://www.animallaw.info/articles/qvusdogbite.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2009).
70. Historically, there was a bright-line dichotomy between cases involving wild ani-
mals that have caused harm (where strict liability was imposed) and cases involving domes-
tic animals (where negligence principles carried the day). See Hilary M. Schwartzberg, Tort
[Vol. 32
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causes of action seem to provide several viable options to injured plaintiffs,
the respective prima facie cases may be difficult to establish and several
powerful defenses are available to defendants, such as provocation, contri-
butory negligence, and victim's prior knowledge.
1. Establishing a Prima Facie Case; Ownership and Scienter
The first (though often overlooked) requirement in stating a cause of
action will be establishing that the defendant was in fact the animal's owner
or keeper.71 For the purposes of dog-bite liability, the determination that a
person was the owner or keeper will not turn on the amount of time the an-
imal was in the person's custody; rather, the question is whether he at-
tempted to control the animal during the period of custody.72 The concept of
undertaking control is generally dispositive of whether one will be found to
be an owner or keeper of an animal. For example, courts have held that
roommates, 73 family members, 74 employers, 75 and landlords76 of a person
who had been entrusted with the care of an animal were not owners and
keepers for the purposes of liability despite their close association to the
entrusted person and the animal.
Having established the identity of the legal owner or keeper, the plain-
tiff now must choose one of two theories of liability: common-law strict
liability or negligence. The case of Bradley v. Hendricks clearly lays out the
prima facie case for common law strict liability in Arkansas77:
It is well settled in Arkansas that when a person is injured by a domestic
animal legally permitted to run at large by its owner, in order for the in-
jured person to recover damages from the owner without the necessity of
Law in Action and Dog Bite Liability: How the American Legal System Blocks Plaintiffs
From Compensation, 40 CONN. L. REv. 845, 857 (2008). Today, however, "thirty-two Amer-
ican states currently provide some form of strict liability rule for harm caused by pet dogs."
Id.
71. See, e.g., Bradley v. Hendricks, 251 Ark. 733, 734, 474 S.W.2d 677, 678 (1972)
(referring to the animal's "owner" four times in laying out the prima facie case).
72. For example, in Fontecchio v. Esposito, the court determined that the dog-sitter
defendant was the keeper of a dog for which she was caring while the owner of the dog was
away. 108 A.D.2d 780 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). Control over the dog was the determinative
factor: the dog-sitter agreed to keep the dog on her premises and to feed, shelter, and general-
ly care for the dog while the owner was on vacation. Id.
73. See Goodman v. Kahn, 356 S.E.2d 757 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
74. See Arslanoglou v. Defayette, 105 A.D.2d 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
75. See Hackett v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 382 S.E.2d 180 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that defendant employer was not a keeper of an employee's dog even though it allowed em-
ployee to keep dog on its premises).
76. See Stokes v. Lyddy, 815 A.2d 263 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 514 (1977).
77. 251 Ark. 733, 474 S.W.2d 677 (1972).
2010]
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proving the owner's negligence, it must be shown that the animal has vi-
cious tendencies or dangerous propensities and that the owner knew, or
should have known, of such tendencies or propensities.
78
The scienter requirement-whether the owner knew of the animal's vi-
cious tendencies or dangerous propensities-is generally a question of
fact.79 For example, in Bradley, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that af-
firmative testimony on the animal's temperament given by witnesses and the
defendant's own testimony as to her knowledge of that temperament consti-
tuted substantial evidence and thus were properly submitted to the jury as
the finder of fact. ° In a subsequent case, Hamby v. Haskins, the Arkansas
Supreme Court established that an owner may have constructive notice of
an animal's viciousness if, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, he
would have been aware of the animal's dangerous propensities. 81 The court
found the fact that the dog's previous owner had kept it contained was suffi-
cient to put the defendant on constructive notice. 82 Hamby is also an exam-
ple of how a plaintiff can pursue a negligence theory in the alternative.
8 3
2. Overcoming Nonlegal Bars to Recovery
The strong correlation between poverty and violent dog attacks cannot
be overlooked in considering a hypothetical victim's decision to sue and her
probability of recovering damages. The KC Dog Blog,84 a website that calls
itself the "Unofficial Watchdog on Animal Welfare Issues," recently posted
an interesting analysis of dog-bite fatalities in 2008.85 Its author undertook
an informal survey of dog-bite fatalities occurring in 2008 as reported by
various media sources and his findings are rather startling. Needless to say,
78. Id. at 734, 474 S.W.2d at 678 (citing Finley v. Smith, 240 Ark. 323, 399 S.W.2d 271
(1966); McIntyre v. Prater, 189 Ark. 596, 74 S.W.2d 639 (1934); Field v. Viraldo, 141 Ark.
32, 216 S.W. 8 (1919); Holt v. Leslie, 116 Ark. 433, 173 S.W. 191 (1915)).
79. Id at 734, 474 S.W.2d at 678.
80. Id. at 740, 474 S.W.2d at 681.
81. 275 Ark. 385, 388,630 S.W.2d 37, 38-39 (1982).
82. Id. at 388, 630 S.W.2d at 38-39.
83. In order to establish a prima facie case in a common law negligence action, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant had a duty to protect persons in the plaintiffs position
from foreseeable dangers posed by the animal, that the defendant breached this duty, and that
the breach of duty was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. See Allison E. Butler, An-
notation, Cause of Action Against Owner, Keeper or Harborer of Domestic Animal to Recov-
erfor Personal Injuries Caused by Animal, 33 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 293 (2008).
84. Brent Toellner, KC Dog Blog, http://btoellner.typepad.com/kcdogblog/ (last visited
Oct. 12, 2009).





the author disclaimed the unscientific nature of his study and acknowledged
that the list is likely to be incomplete.86 Nevertheless, the study found that
almost every fatal attack on adults during 2008 happened in a low-income
city or county.8 7 The study defined low-income areas as any city or county
with a poverty rate above the national level of twelve percent.88 Possible
explanations for this phenomenon include lower levels of education (which
might lead to poor ownership and training practices), high-crime neighbor-
hoods (which might incentivize ownership of aggressive breeds), and great-
er levels of household violence (which might increase the aggressiveness of
dogs). Regardless of the cause, the realities of shallow-pocket defendants
and their likely lack of substantial liability insurance might effectively pre-
vent a victim from even pursuing redress in the courts.
3. Affirmative Defenses
Even when a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case under strict lia-
bility theories or negligence, it can be difficult to prevail. This is because
the dog-owner has several potent affirmative defenses, most importantly the
doctrines of provocation and comparative negligence.
a. Provocation
The concept of provocation is that although the dog-bite victim was
indeed injured by the animal, he directly caused it to become aggressive,
and therefore should not be allowed to hold its owner responsible because
without his action the attack would not have occurred. 89 Under Arkansas
law, the doctrine is recognized in Model Jury Instruction 1603:
6C contend(s) that _ was guilty of fault which was a
proximate cause of his/her own [injury] [damages]. _ [has] [have]
the burden of proving this contention." 90 Although no Arkansas case specif-
ically discusses what constitutes provocation, other jurisdictions have held
the following acts as provocation and denied liability: striking the dog,91
86. Id.
87. Id. Interestingly, attacks on young children did not seem to have as strong of a cor-
relation. The author attributes this to the fact that those types of attacks necessarily involve
negligence on the part of supervising adults and do not likely implicate society-wide trends
or factors.
88. Id.
89. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Intentional Provocation, Contributory or Compara-
tive Negligence, or Assumption of Risk as Defense to Action for Injury by Dog, 11 A.L.R. 5th
127, 147 (1993) (stating that "it would not be just to make the owner pay where the bite was
the fault of the victim.").
90. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIViL AMI 1603 (2008).
91. See, e.g., Paulsen v. Courtney, 277 N.W.2d 233 (Neb. 1979).
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pulling or pushing the dog or its chain, 92 hugging the dog,93 straddling or
attempting to ride the dog,94 carrying the dog,95 stepping on or falling over
the dog,96 shouting or yelling at the dog,97 playing with the dog,98 feeding
the dog, 99 approaching the dog/proximity, 00 putting body part through or
over a fence,' 0'and entering yard or porch area. 0 2 This list is not exhaus-
tive 0 3 nor is it clear that these acts automatically trigger the provocation
defense;1°4 rather, it tends to show that a defendant generally has a broad
initiative to establish the defense.
b. Comparative negligence
Unlike some jurisdictions that apply the harsh doctrine of contributory
negligence,' 0 5 Arkansas employs the more equitable doctrine of compara-
tive negligence.06
Arkansas Model Jury Instruction 1604 sets forth the doctrine in dog-
bite cases:
If you should find that the occurrence was proximately caused by the
conduct of in keeping the animal and not by any fault on
the part of _, then is entitled to recover the full
amount of any damages he/she has sustained as a result of the occur-
rence.
If you fird that the occurrence was proximately caused both by
's conduct in keeping the animal and by fault on the part of
, then you must determine their comparative fault.
If the fault of is of less degree than the fault of
, then _ is entitled to recover any damages which
you may find he/she has sustained as a result of the occurrence after you
92. See, e.g., Reed v. Bowen, 503 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
93. See, e.g., Nelson v. Hansen, 102 N.W.2d 251 (Wis. 1960).
94. See, e.g., Staniszeski v. Walker, 550 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
95. See, e.g., Pulley v. Malek, 495 N.E.2d 402 (Ohio 1986).
96. See, e.g., Rutland v. Biel, 277 So. 2d 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
97. See, e.g., Hayes v. McFarland, 535 So. 2d 568 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
98. See, e.g., Grummel v. Decker, 292 N.W. 562 (Mich. 1940).
99. See, e.g., Stehl v. Dose, 403 N.E.2d 1301 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
100. See, e.g., Ambort v. Nowlin, 289 Ark. 124, 709 S.W.2d 407 (1986).
101. See, e.g., Blair v. Jackson, 526 S.W.2d 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).
102. See, e.g., Gomes v. Byrne, 333 P.2d 754 (Cal. 1959).
103. See generally, Zitter, supra note 89.
104. Id
105. The doctrine of contributory negligence acts as a total bar to recovery where the
plaintiff is shown to have some degree of fault in his injury. See Chausse v. Southland Corp.,
400 So. 2d 1199, 1202 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
106. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (LEXIS Repl. 2005).
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have reduced them in proportion to the degree of his/her own fault. On
the other hand, if the fault of is equal to or greater in degree
than the fault of , then is not entitled to recover
any damages.1
0 7
The case of Ambort v. Nowlin illustrates this doctrine in action. 08 In
Ambort, the plaintiff was a traveling salesman who approached the front
porch of the defendant (who turned out to be a mentally disabled woman
with little ability to communicate).' 0 9 One of the defendant's dogs jumped
up and bit off a portion of the plaintiffs nose."0 The trial judge submitted
the case to the jury based on the theory of comparative negligence rather
than strict liability, and the jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff s favor for
approximately $5000 despite his claim of over $7000 in medical bills and
$3000 in lost wages.' l The appellate court held that this was proper, finding
"[t]here was a fact question of whether [the plaintiff] was trespassing or a
licensee since he was on private property and had not been expressly invited
there."' 12 Thus, the court upheld the reduced verdict.
C. Criminal Liability for Harm Caused by Dog Bites
There are two principal theories of punishment in the criminal law: uti-
litarianism and retributivism. 13 Under a utilitarian theory, punishment is
only justifiable if it will reduce crime. 14 Proportionality between the pu-
nishment and the crime is critical to utilitarians because, to them, punish-
ment is not desirable in itself; rather, it is viewed as a means to prevent
crime and thereby improve society. 1 5 Furthermore, utilitarians consider
whether the goal is general deterrence, when the punishment is imposed "in
107. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL AMI 1604 (2008).
108. 289 Ark. 124, 709 S.W.2d 407 (1986).
109. Id. at 125, 709 S.W.2d at 408.
110. Id. at 125, 709 S.W.2d at 408.
111. Id. at 125-26, 709 S.W.2d at 408.
112. Id. at 126, 709 S.W.2d at 408 (alteration in original). This fact is important because
AMI 1602 (the strict liability instruction) provides a note that a court should not use this
instruction "when the plaintiff is a trespasser as a matter of law." ARKANSAS MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL AMI 1602 (2008). Also, the note states that the instruction should be
appropriately modified "if there is an issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff is a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee .... Id.
113. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03[A] (3d ed. 2001).
114. Id. § 2.03[B][1].
115. Id. Utilitarians generally speak in terms of cost-benefit economic analysis. Profes-
sor Dressier explains that, to a classical utilitarian, "the imposition of five units of pain (how-
ever the "units" are measured) on [a defendant] is justifiable if it will prevent more than five




order to convince the general community to forego criminal conduct in the
future,"'"16 or specific deterrence, when the punishment "is meant to deter
future misconduct" by a particular defendant by "prevent[ing] him from
committing crimes in the outside society during the period of his segrega-
tion" and "reminding him that if he returns to a life of crime, he will expe-
rience more pain.
'' 17
On the other hand, retributivism punishes the wrongdoer simply be-
cause he deserves it, rather than as a means of protecting society." 8 The
central idea behind retribution is that the defendant should suffer as a way
of paying for his crime. 1 9 The concept of proportionality is also central to
retributive theory: "a person [is deemed] more deserving of punishment if
he intentionally, rather than ... negligently, causes the particular harm."'2 °
The imposition of criminal liability upon owners of vicious dogs that
have severely injured or killed an innocent party is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon.1 21 Generally, there are two circumstances under which an owner
may face criminal charges related to the violent actions of his dog: when the
owner directly incites his dog to attack the victim ("sic 'em" cases), 12 2 or
when the owner uses a vicious dog during the commission of a separate
crime ("aggravating circumstances" cases). 123 Under either scenario, the dog
is treated as a deadly weapon or dangerous instrumentality of its owner. 24 It
116. Id. § 2.03[B][2].
117. Id.
118. Id § 2.03[C][1].
119. DRESSLER, supra note 113, at § 2.03[C][2]. Some retributivists also believe that
punishment is a "defeat of the wrongdoer," whose unlawful actions manifest a belief "that his
(the criminal's) rights and desires are more valuable than those of the victim." Id. (citing Jean
Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 1659, 1686 (1992)). This form of retributive theory has been called "victim vindica-
tion." Id.
120. Id. § 6.03[B][1]. This is essentially an inquiry into a defendant's "moral blamewor-
thiness." Id.
121. See Mary Stanfield Bubbett, In the Doghouse or in the Jailhouse?: The Possibility
of Criminal Prosecution of the Owners of Vicious Dogs in Louisiana, 49 Loy. L. REv. 953,
960(2003).
122. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 594 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Bodoh, 582
N.W.2d 440 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998); Morris v. State, 722 So. 2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998)). The phrase, "sic 'em," is slang for "attack that." Urban Dictionary, sic 'em,
http://www.urbandictionary.com (search "sic 'em") (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
123. See, e.g., State v. Michels, 726 So. 2d 449 (La. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Sinks, 483
N.W.2d 286 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
124. In the criminal law, the classification of things--other than firearms-as deadly
weapons is usually a functional process. For example, in State v. Cook, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals applied the following three-factor test: "'the nature of the instrument, the
manner in which defendant used it or threatened to use it, and in some cases the victim's
perception of the instrument and its use."' 594 S.E.2d 819, 821-22 (quoting State v. Peacock,
330 S.E.2d 190, 196 (N.C. 1985)).
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is manifest that a vicious dog qualifies as a weapon,125 and increasingly
courts are holding that a dog can satisfy the requirements of a deadly wea-
pon.1
26
1. "Sic 'em " Cases
When the owner incites his dog to attack, the proper analysis is akin to
that of a criminal assault. 127 The Florida case of Morris v. State is illustra-
tive. 128 The defendant, Erika Morris, owned a large mixed-breed dog that
resembled a Rottweiler. 129 When a law enforcement officer approached
Morris about another matter, Morris gave the dog a "sic" command and it
bit the officer on the right calf and thigh. 30 Emphasizing that "'whether or
not a particular dog is a deadly weapon or instrument will depend on the
circumstances of each case,"",13 1 the court held that there was sufficient evi-
dence from which a jury could find that Morris's dog was a deadly wea-
pon.
32
One court has held that even nonowners can be held criminally liable
for the actions of a dog if they incite an attack on a third party. That case,
State v. Cook, also concerned an attack on a law enforcement officer. 133 At
trial, the State adduced the following facts. Two police officers pulled over
the defendant for minor traffic offenses. 34 Shortly thereafter, a scuffle en-
125. See Smith v. Nussman, 156 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (defining a
weapon as "anything used or designed to be used in destroying, defeating, or injuring an
enemy-an instrument of offensive or defensive combat.") (citation omitted)).
126. See State v. Bodoh, 582 N.W.2d 440, 442 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (reiterating that
"'[i]t is common knowledge that dogs can inflict severe injury and can... attack."') (quoting
Sinks, 483 N.W.2d at 290) (alterations in original)).
127. Under the Model Penal Code, a defendant is guilty of simple assault if he
(a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another; or
(b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(c) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious
bodily injury. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (2001).
128. 722 So. 2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
129. Id. at 850-51.
130. Id. at 851.
131. Id. at 850. (quoting People v. Nealis, 283 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (Cal. App. Dep't Su-
per. Ct. 2001)). The court broadly applied Florida's "deadly weapon" definition: "[Any
instrument which, when it is used in the ordinary manner contemplated by its design and
construction, will or is likely to cause great bodily harm, or any instrument likely to cause
great bodily harm because of the way it is used during a crime." Id. (quoting Taylor v. State,
672 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (alterations in original)).
132. Id.
133. 594 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
134. Id. at 820.
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sued and Cook escaped the officers' restraints. 135 He subsequently fled on
foot to the back yard of his sister's home where there was a medium-sized
dog on a chain. 136 Cook placed himself between the dog and the police of-
ficers. 137 When the first officer reached the back yard, Cook pushed the dog
toward him and said, "bite him."1 38 In the midst of a commotion during
which Cook was eventually subdued and handcuffed, the dog bit both offic-
ers on the lower leg.139 Citing Morris v. State,140 the court upheld Cook's
conviction on two counts of assault with a deadly weapon on a government
official. 141
2. Dog as Aggravating Circumstance During the Commission of a
Crime
A second line of cases establishes criminal liability where the owner
uses his dog during the commission of an independent felony, such as arson,
burglary, kidnapping, larceny, rape, robbery, or sodomy. 42 In these cir-
cumstances the defendant's use of the dog, so long as it is found to be a
dangerous or deadly weapon or instrumentality, can be held to be an aggra-
vating circumstance to the primary bad act. 143
a. When owner affirmatively uses dog as a dangerous weapon
The concept of aggravation is an American statutory invention with lit-
tle basis in the common law. 44 A crime may be aggravated if it is "made
worse or more serious by circumstances such as violence, the presence of a
deadly weapon, or the intent to commit another crime.' ' 145 In these cases, the
State must first prove the underlying crime and then demonstrate the aggra-




138. Id at 820-21.
139. See Cook, 594 S.E.2d at 821.
140. 722 So. 2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (1998). See supra notes 128-32 and accompany-
ing text.
141. Cook, 594 S.E.2d at 822. In so holding, the court scrutinized both Cook's use of the
dog and the officers' perception of its violent potential, in addition to the dog's vicious na-
ture. Id.
142. See Bubbett, supra note 121, at 960.
143. See, e.g., State v. Michels, 726 So. 2d 449 (La. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Sinks, 483
N.W.2d 286 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
144. See State v. Sorenson, 359 P.2d 289, 291 (Haw. 1961).
145. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (9th ed. 2009).
146. "Aggravating circumstance" is defined as a "fact or situation that increases the
degree of liability or culpability for a criminal act." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 277 (9th ed.
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crime of a higher degree, the aggravating circumstance is usually the own-
er's use of an instrumentality or weapon classified as dangerous or deadly.
For example, in State v. Sinks, the defendant was tried and convicted on one
count of kidnapping and three counts of first-degree sexual assault.147 In
Wisconsin, a person is guilty of first-degree sexual assault if he, "[h]as sex-
ual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of that
person by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon or any article used or
fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be a
dangerous weapon."'148 The facts of Sinks are as follows. Defendant Sinks
came upon the victim while she was stranded on the roadside after her car
ran out of fuel and offered to take her to his home to use his telephone and
borrow a gas can.149 During the drive to Sinks's home, he remarked to his
victim that "he had a doberman pinscher and that the dog once prevented a
burglar from getting away after breaking into his home."' 50 Once inside his
home, "Sinks held a knife to her throat and instructed his doberman to
'guard. ' ' 151 The victim testified that "she believed the dog would kill her if
she tried to leave and that she was afraid of it.",152 Sinks proceeded to brutal-
ly rape his victim while his doberman "stood guard.'
53
Sinks appealed his first-degree sexual assault conviction arguing that
"a dog cannot be an instrumentality because instrumentality refers only to
an inanimate object.' ' 154 The appellate court rejected this argument based on
rules of statutory construction 155 and precedent from other jurisdictions.
5 6
2009). For example, under the Model Penal Code (MPC), a person is guilty of aggravated
assault if he: "attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury pur-
posely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life; or... attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury
to another with a deadly weapon." MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2) (2001). Unlike simple
assault, which is either a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor under the MPC, id. § 211.1(1),
aggravated assault is a felony of either the second or third degree. Id. Observe the statute's
heightened scienter requirement ("purposely, knowingly or recklessly"), its focus on the
character of the action ("extreme indifference to the value of human life"), and, most impor-
tantly, its "deadly weapon" requirement. Id.
147. 483 N.W.2d 286, 287-88 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
148. Id. at 288 (citing Wis. STAT. § 940.225(1)) (emphasis added).




153. Sinks, 483 N.W.2d at 287.
154. Id. at 289.
155. Id. The court held that the "common and ordinary definition" of instrumentality is
not so limited to inanimate objects, but is rather "something by which an end is achieved."
Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1172 (Unabr. 1976)). It also noted
that the definition of "dangerous weapon" in a companion statute was not "limit[ed] or con-
fine[d] ... to only inanimate objects." Id.
156. Id. at 289-90 (citing People v. Kay, 328 N.W.2d 424, 425-26 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
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Having concluded that a dog can be a dangerous weapon, the appellate court
addressed the question of whether the trial court properly concluded that
Sinks "used or intended to use [his] particular dog in a manner likely to
produce death or great bodily harm."'157 The court answered in the affirma-
tive citing the victim's testimony regarding Sinks's dog restraining a would-
be burglar, Sinks's "guard" instruction to the dog, and the dog's presence
during the assault. 158 Moreover, the court noted that Sinks was aware of the
dog's vicious propensities as demonstrated by his construction of a dog pen
following complaints about the animal.'59
b. When vicious dog is merely present during commission of a
crime
A somewhat similar case, State v. Michels, went a step further than
Sinks and held that the mere presence of a vicious dog during the commis-
sion of a crime-even when the defendant does not directly command the
dog to become aggressive or persuade his victim to believe in its dangerous
potential-is enough to convict the defendant of using an aggravating en-
hancement.160 In Michels, the victim was visiting the defendant inside of his
trailer and both were enjoying an alcoholic beverage. 161 While the victim
and Michels were sitting on his couch, Michels removed his pants and those
of his victim, forced his victim to perform oral sex on him, and then raped
her.' 62 The victim testified that during the assault, Michels's pit bull was
near them and bared its teeth and growled while she struggled with Mi-
chels.' 63 She further testified that if she continued to struggle with Michels,
the dog would attack her. 64
The trial court convicted Michels under Louisiana's aggravated oral
sexual battery statute, 165 which the appellate court quoted, in pertinent part:
Aggravated oral sexual battery is an oral sexual battery committed when
the intentional touching ... is deemed to be without the lawful consent
of the victim because it is committed under any one or more of the fol-
lowing circumstances:
and Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 314 N.E.2d 448, 450-51 (Mass. Ct. App. 1974)).
157. Id. at 290.
158. Id.
159. Sinks, 483 N.W.2d at 290.
160. 726 So. 2d 449 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
161. Id. at 450.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 452-53.
164. Id. at 453.
165. Id. at 451.
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(3) When the victim is prevented from the resisting the act because the
offender is armed with a dangerous weapon. 166
On appeal, Michels argued that the mere presence of his dog during the
encounter did not satisfy the third subsection's requirement of being "armed
with a dangerous weapon," and therefore, the State did not carry its burden
of proving that the victim did not lawfully consent. 167 Citing the Louisiana
rule that "the dangerousness of the instrumentality ... is a factual question
for the jury,' 68 the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury's finding that Michels's dog was a dangerous weapon within the




This note establishes that the dog-bite problem is usually approached
from three distinct legal angles. 70 First, cities and municipal governments
establish regulations on the ownership of dogs generally through licensing
or permit mechanisms and specifically on the ownership of purportedly
vicious dogs through dangerous-dog or breed-specific ordinances.17 1
Second, the law of tort provides dog-bite victims with causes of action
against the owner for civil damages related to the attack.172 Third, the crimi-
nal law provides certain penalties in only the most egregious cases. 173 The
order in which I have presented these methods of dealing with the problem
is in inverse proportion to their comparative efficacy.
For example, most of the breed-bans set forth in municipal codes
represent a knee-jerk approach meant to ensure the safety of vulnerable citi-
zens following a well-publicized and especially vicious attack. 174 Yet such
an approach only improves the safety of a community if there are a number
of otherwise model, law-abiding citizens who happen to be harboring vi-
166. Michels, 726 So. 2d at 451 (quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.4(A) (1999)).
167. Id. at 452.
168. Id. at 453 (citing State v. Munoz, 575 So. 2d 848, 850 (La. Ct. App. 1991), writ
denied, 577 So. 2d 1009 (La. 1991)).
169. Id.
170. See supra Part II.
171. See supra Part II.A.
172. See supra Part II.B.
173. See supra Part II.C.
174. For example, following a horrific attack on a three-year-old boy in which four pit
bulls ripped off one of the boy's arms, a state legislator proposed a statewide ban on the
ownership of the breed. See Mick Hinton, Pit Bull Ban Proposed: Lawmaker's Idea Draws
Quick Opposition, TULSA WORLD, July 17, 2005, at A13.
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cious dogs--of the named breed(s)-in an irresponsible manner that permits
grossly violent incidents to occur. In effect, the registration approach merely
infringes upon the civil liberties of a substantial number of dog owners who
have nurtured docile and loving pets that pose no threat to the community,
while incentivizing rogue ownership and poor breeding practices of the
most potentially dangerous breeds by non-law-abiding citizens.
The proper legislative response to an especially vicious attack is an ex-
amination of the relevant criminal statutes to make sure that there is a pro-
portionate punishment available to the owners of dogs that severely maim or
kill a person.1 75 For this reason, the following proposal focuses primarily on
expanding criminal liability while suggesting modest but meaningful re-
forms in civil remedies and registration laws.
A. Criminal Law-the "Big Stick"
Under either utilitarian or retributive theory, Arkansas's current crimi-
nal dog-bite legislation fails miserably. The statute, entitled Unlawful Dog
Attack, 176 was enacted in Arkansas in 2007 and provides:
(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful dog attack if:
(1) The person owns a dog that the person knows or has reason to
know has a propensity to attack, cause injury, or endanger the safety
of other persons without provocation;
(2) The person negligently allows the dog to attack another person;
and
(3) The attack causes the death of or serious physical injury to the
person attacked.
(b) The offense of unlawful dog attack is a Class A misdemeanor.
(c) In addition to any penalty imposed under this section, the court or
jury may require the defendant to pay restitution under section 5-4-205
for any medical bills of the person attacked for injuries caused by the at-
tack.
177
175. Devin Burstein succinctly expressed this sentiment in his introductory note to the
following cited comment: "To prevent the tragedies that can occur when a dog attacks a
human, legislation must take aim at the heart of the problem, the human owners that allow,
through negligence or intentional mistreatment and training, these attacks to occur." Devin
Burstein, Breed Specific Legislation: Unfair Prejudice & Ineffective Policy, 10 ANIMAL L.
313, 313 (2004).




First, the statute imposes a scienter requirement that, although merely
meant to establish the requisite mens rea, will operate in practice as a diffi-
cult hurdle for prosecutors to overcome. Second, the statute does not pro-
vide proportional punishment. Observe that the statute is not triggered un-
less the attack "causes the death of or serious physical injury to the person
attacked."' 178 Such an attack would likely be of a gruesome and torturous
nature. Yet the animal's owner faces a relatively light penalty because the
offense is only a Class A misdemeanor.179 Under Arkansas law, a Class A
misdemeanor carries a maximum prison sentence of one year.
80
Under a retributive analysis-assuming arguendo a guilty verdict and a
one-year prison sentence-the owner of the dog is forced to pay too small a
price for his crime, particularly when the victim is killed or permanently
disabled. Such an owner simply will not suffer enough. Similarly, the utili-
tarian view is unsatisfied. From a general deterrence perspective, the fear of
spending one year in jail is not likely to incentivize a dog owner to take the
kind of precautionary steps that eliminate substantial risks of harm. From a
specific deterrence perspective, the penalty is even more unsatisfactory.
Although one year in prison would most certainly be unpleasant, it is short
enough that upon the owner's release he will find a status quo within which
he can easily obtain another vicious animal and resume his previous life-
style.
Either theory of punishment seems to demand a consequence more in
line with manslaughter, aggravated assault, or aggravated battery. The Ar-
kansas manslaughter statute is set forth in Arkansas Code section 5-10-104.
Subsection (a)(3) is on point: "A person commits manslaughter if:... [t]he
person recklessly causes the death of another person.' ' 18 Manslaughter is a
Class C felony, 182 and it carries a minimum three-year and maximum ten-
year prison sentence. 183 An important affirmative defense in the manslaugh-
ter statute is the defendant's non-use of a deadly weapon.184 A recent case,
Duke v. State, however, held that dogs can be "used in such a manner as to
constitute deadly weapons." 185 Thus, it seems that a manslaughter convic-
tion is possible under Arkansas law. Such a substantial jail sentence and the
stigma that accompanies the conviction would be a strong deterrent to socie-
ty at large and anyone convicted under the statute. Furthermore, an individ-
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(b)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2007).
181. Id. § 5-10-104(a)(3) (LEXIS Supp. 2009).
182. Id. § 5-10-104 (c).
183. Id. § 5-4-401(a)(4) (LEXIS Repl. 2006).
184. Id. § 5-10-104(b)(2) (LEXIS Supp. 2009).
185. 77 Ark. App. 263, 272, 72 S.W.3d 907,913 (2002).
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ual convicted under this statute would more realistically "pay his debt to
society.
'' 86
In cases where the victim survives an extremely vicious attack, an ag-
gravated assault charge is appropriate. Arkansas's aggravated assault law is
set forth in Arkansas Code section 5-13-204. Under the statute, "a person
commits aggravated assault if, under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life, he or she purposely ... [e]ngages in
conduct that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury
to another person.' ' 187 The key here is that the owner need not have intended
to assault the victim, but rather must have "engage[d] in conduct that
create[d] a substantial danger" to another.' 88 The statute is a Class D felo-
ny; 189 therefore, a dog owner convicted under it would face a maximum
sentence of six years in prison.190
In summation, the criminal law of Arkansas must address the disparity
in crimes and sentencing between generally violent offenses and crimes
involving a dog attack. The latter crimes are just as deleterious to society,
the victims are just as debased, and the owners of these dogs are just as mo-
rally culpable. One possible solution to this problem would be the enact-
ment of a reckless endangerment statute.
Arkansas is one of several states without a reckless endangerment sta-
tute. 191 One state that has such a provision is Maryland. 192 The Maryland
law provides, in pertinent part, "[a] person may not recklessly... engage in
conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to
another.' 193 Although the statute only provides a misdemeanor offense, it
does allow for a prison sentence of up to five years. 194 The statute does not
apply to conduct involving the "manufacture, production, or sale of a prod-
uct or commodity. ' ' 195 If Arkansas were to adopt a similar law, prosecutors
would be able to confront situations when the owner allows-though does
not at all encourage-his dog to cause grievous bodily harm to an innocent
person. At present, Arkansas can only prosecute owners in "sic 'em" scena-
rios or when the dog is used as a dangerous instrumentality during the
186. This assumes a lack of intent or purpose to kill the victim. If the defendant acted
with the requisite mens rea for murder, then that statute, rather than ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-10-104, should be applied.
187. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-204(a)(1) (LEXIS Supp. 2009).
188. Id.
189. Id. § 5-13-204(b).
190. Id. § 5-4-401(a)(5) (LEXIS Repl. 2007).
191. See Earl v. State, No. CA CR 90-103, 1991 WL 36295, at *2 (Ark. App. Mar. 13,
1991) (noting that there is "no such offense in our criminal code.").
192. See MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 3-204 (West 2008).
193. Id. § 3-204(a)(1).
194. Id. § 3-204(b).
195. Id. § 3-204(c)(1)(ii).
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commission of a felony. The reckless endangerment option for prosecutors
would likely act as a significant deterrent to owners who impose nonreci-
procal risks on society through their reckless handling and training practic-
es.
B. Making Tort Law Work for Dog-Bite Victims and Owners
Historically a dog owner's liability was in keeping the animal "after
gaining knowledge of its propensity for abnormally vicious behavior."'
196
This principle evolved in a logical manner. Then, as now, dogs were "man's
best friend" and were considered cherished companions. Thus, the default
state of dogs-as a matter of law-was not vicious.197 When, however, an
animal was in fact dangerous or vicious (an exception to the aforementioned
presumption), an abnormality arose.' 98 A dog owner could only be liable
after he was put on notice of his dog's "abnormality," which essentially
meant that the dog got "one free bite."'199 This law was friendly to dog own-
ers and quite unfriendly to victims because proving the owner's knowledge
of his dog's abnormality, the so-called scienter requirement, was extremely
difficult.
More modernly, however, some states have removed the scienter re-
quirement and created de facto strict liability for owners of biting dogs.
These "dog-bite statutes" exist in about half of the states.20 ° In Illinois, for
example, the dog-bite statute provides, pertinent part:
If a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks.., or injures any
person who is peaceably conducting himself.., in any place where he..
.may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in...
damages to such person for the full amount of the injury proximately
caused thereby.
201
Cases under statutes like this one typically turn on whether the victim
provoked the attack.20 2 Because reading the mind of an animal is nearly
impossible, such statutes are usually very friendly to the victim.
196. See Lynn A. Epstein, There are no Bad Dogs, Only Bad Owners: Replacing Strict
Liability with a Negligence Standard in Dog Bite Cases, 13 ANIMAL L. 129, 132 (2006)
(citing Andrews v. Smith, 188 A. 146, 148 (Pa. 1936)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 134. The expression "one free bite" is somewhat misleading. As a practical
matter, the requirement of proving the dog's prior bites was very difficult, and therefore,
dogs at common law might have had many free bites. Id.
200. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS).
201. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16 (West 2006).
202. Epstein, supra note 196, at 135 (citing Nelson v. Lewis, 344 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1976) (stating that the issue at trial was whether the plaintiffs intentional act consti-
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One scholar, Professor Lynn Epstein, °3 has proposed a middle ground
between the common law and strict liability models: plain negligence. Pro-
fessor Epstein's concept is founded upon an analogy to children. She points
out that, under the Restatement of Torts, "parents may become liable for
their own inaction in failing to prevent their children from harming oth-
ers." 2°4 The notion is that "parents have a duty to exercise reasonable care to
control their minor children in order to prevent them from causing harm to
others, if the parent knows he has the ability to control his child and knows
of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control., 20 5 Professor
Epstein's proposal is as follows:
A person who harbors or possesses a domestic animal, such as a dog,
has a duty to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Preventing a
risk of harm includes controlling and supervising the dog in order to make
conditions safe for those with whom the dog comes into contact.20 6
These principles in combination with the law of simple negligence
should form the basis of a single jury instruction for all civil dog-bite cas-
es. 2 07 Such an instruction might read as follows:
A person who harbors or possesses a domestic animal has a duty to pre-
vent an unreasonable risk of harm to others. This includes controlling
and supervising the animal so that conditions are safe for those with
whom the animal comes into contact. A person's failure to meet this
standard of reasonable care is negligence. If you find that this negligence
caused, in a natural and continuous sequence, harm to the plaintiff and
without which the harm would not have occurred, your verdict should be
against the defendant.
Observe that this instruction is modeled after basic hornbook law of
negligence: duty, breach, causation, and harm. It is intended to effect two
critical reforms upon current Arkansas law: (1) the abrogation of the com-
mon-law scienter requirement and (2) the adoption of a more expansive
view of the proper scope of a dog owner's duty to innocent persons. Such an
instruction would permit a deserving plaintiff to recover damages while
insulating prudent and responsible dog owners against frivolous actions.
tuted "provocation")).
203. Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center at Nova Southeastem University.
204. Epstein, supra note 196, at 141 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316
cmt. a (1977)).
205. Id. at 141-42.
206. Id. at 144.
207. Currently, the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions contain four separate instructions to
be used in civil suits arising out of a dog bite, 1601 through 1604. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL AMI 1601-04 (2008).
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C. Local Ordinances That Are Practical and Fair
Breed-specific legislation will not solve the dog-bite problem. Rather,
it is likely to make things worse. When a ban is instituted, a black market is
created. Breeding practices become even more suspect, dogs' healthcare
needs become more neglected, and law-abiding owners of these breeds have
to move or give up their beloved pets. What local governments should do to
maintain safety and order is strictly enforce all basic "dog laws" such as
mandatory licensing, rabies vaccination, leash laws, nuisance laws, and ab-
solutely prohibit any sort of illegal tie-ups or other aberrant containment
techniques. Requiring proof of spay or neuter would be an extremely posi-
tive step as well; not only do spayed or neutered dogs act more peaceably,
20 8
but the stray population would naturally decrease as well. Obviously, some
sort of breeding permit would be required to exempt those animals kept by
legitimate dog breeders from the spay or neuter requirement.
Stricter licensing laws would have an enormously positive effect. If a
city had an accurate accounting of all pets in its jurisdiction, imagine how
much more effectively an injured victim could seek redress. Furthermore,
those who refused to properly license their dogs-likely the same people
who neglect their animals and encourage their antisocial and violent beha-
vior-would forfeit their current and any future ownership rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current method of dealing with the dog-bite problem in Arkansas
(and throughout the country) is irrational and counterproductive. What is
most important is the deterrence of irresponsible ownership, and for that, the
criminal law is the most effective vehicle. In addition to imposing aggra-
vated criminal liability on a dog owner who incites his dog to attack an in-
nocent party or uses his dog as a dangerous instrumentality during the
commission of a felony, states should vigorously prosecute any owner
whose dog severely wounds or kills an innocent party under a reckless en-
dangerment-type statute. Second, civil dog-bite actions should be vastly
simplified to a common-sense negligence standard. This change could be
most effectively implemented by an amendment to the Arkansas Model Jury
Instructions. Finally, breed-specific legislation should be repealed and local
208. See, e.g., Cynthia A. McNeely & Sarah A. Lindquist, Dangerous Dog Laws: Failing
to Give Man's Best Friend a Fair Shake at Justice, 3 J. ANIMAL L. 99 n. 112 (citing statistical
data on the comparative aggressiveness of unneutered male dogs in KAREN DELISE, FATAL
DOG ATTACKS: THE STORIES BEHIND THE STATISTICS (2002) ("[U]nneutered males are 2.6




municipalities should focus on enforcing basic dog control laws such as
vaccination, spay-neuter, and leash laws.
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